When his

BEFORE THE 1 SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD STATE OF WASHINGTON 2 IN THE MATTER OF A SUBSTANTIAL 3 DEVELOPMENT PERMIT DENIED BY SNOHOMISH COUNTY TO 4 D. D. GRAHAM, 5 SHB No. 85 D. D. GRAHAM, 6 FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, Appellant, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 7 AND ORDER v. 8 SNOHOMISH COUNTY, 9 Respondent. 10

THIS MATTER, the request for review of appellant, D. D. Graham, of the denial of a shoreline management substantial development permit by respondent, Snohomish County, having come on regularly for hearing on the 29th day of September, 1975 in Everett, Washington, and appellant D. D. Graham appearing through his attorney, Edward D. Hansen, and respondent Snohomish County appearing through its attorney, Richard S. Lowry, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, with Ellen D. Peterson, hearing examiner presiding, and the Board having either heard the testimony or

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

considered the record, and having reviewed the exhibits and post-hearing briefs herein, and having entered on the 23d day of February, 1976, its proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and the Board having served said proposed Findings, Conclusions and Order upon all parties herein by certified mail, return receipt requested and twenty days having elapsed from said service; and

The Board having received no exceptions to said proposed Findings, Conclusions and Order and the Board being fully advised in the premises; now therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated the 23d day of February, 1976, and incorporated by this reference herein and attached hereto as Exhibit A, are adopted and hereby entered as the Board's Final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order herein.

DONE at Lacey, Washington, this 19th day of March, 1976.

SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD

ROBERT E. BEATY, Member

RATPH A. BESWICK, Member

W. A. GISSBERG, Member

PORERT F. HINTZ. Member

WALT WOODWARD, Membe

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

1	CERTIFICATION OF MAILING
2	I, Dolories Osland, certify that I deposited in the United States
3	mail, copies of the foregoing document on the 19th day of
4	, 1976, to each of the following-named parties,
5	at the last known post office addresses, with the proper postage affixed
6	to the respective envelopes:
7	Mr. Richard S. Lowry Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
8	Office of Snohomish County  Prosecuting Attorney
9	Snohomish County Courthouse Everett, Washington 98201
10	Mr. Edward D. Hansen
11	Williams, Novack & Hansen, P. S. 501 First National Bank Building
12	Everett, Washington 98201
3 14	Mr. D. D. Graham 336 N.W. 175th Seattle, Washington 98177
15	Snohomish County Commissioners
16	Snohomish County Courthouse Everett, Washington 98201
17	
18	DOLORIES OSLAND, Clerk of the
19	SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 3

**∠**6

BEFORE THE 1 SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD 2 STATE OF WASHINGTON IN THE MATTER OF A SUBSTANTIAL 3 DEVELOPMENT PERMIT DENIED BY SNOHOMISH COUNTY TO 4 D. D. GRAHAM, D. D. GRAHAM, SHB No. 85 6 Appellant, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 7 AND ORDER v. 8 SNOHOMISH COUNTY, 9 Respondent. 10

A hearing on the request for review of appellant, D. D. Graham, of the denial of a shoreline management substantial development permit by respondent, Snohomish County, was held in Everett, Washington, on September 29, 1975, before Board members, Ralph A. Beswick, Robert F. Hintz and Robert E. Beaty; Ellen D. Peterson, hearing officer, presided. Edward D. Hansen appeared as attorney for appellant, D. D. Graham; Richard S. Lowry, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, represented the

EXHIBIT A

respondent, Snohomish County.

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Having either heard the testimony or considered the record, and having reviewed the exhibits and post-hearing briefs, the Board makes and enters these

## FINDINGS OF FACT

I

The proposed project site is a shoreline of state-wide significance.

ΙI

The proposed development would fill 11.5 acres of a twenty-acre site owned or under purchase contract by appellant. The site consists of two adjoining parcels of land located on the east bank of the main channel of the Snohomish River in Sections 21 and 28, Township 29 N, Range 5 E.W.M. The property includes the major portion of the 1930 Plat of River Front Tracts (hereinafter Area I) in addition to unplatted lar south of the state highway (Area II).

The site is located immediately upstream of the point of divergence of Steamboat and Union Sloughs and is directly east, across the Snohomish River, from the City of Everett. It is bisected east-west by two elevated trestles of state Route 2, a controlled access highway in this area. A Snohomish County dike, approximately 13 feet above mean sea level, partially surrounds the southern boundary of Area II.

III

Area I is zoned for rural use with a flood plain overlay (designation of flood hazard) and Area II is zoned agricultural with a flood plain overlay. The Snohomish County Comprehensive Plan, adopted in 1956, designates future use of the project site as agricultural. No draft master program was in existence at the time the permit was denied.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

The project site has a history of industrial use but in recent years and prior to appellant's acquisition the site reverted to its present undeveloped state as marshland subject to periodic flooding. All of the property lies within the flood plain.

The topography varies from five to eleven feet above mean sea level.

Vegetation and wildlife of Area I is that typical of marshland; Area II is almost entirely forested by large alder.

IV

An application for a substantial development permit was filed by appellant with the Snohomish County Planning Department on November 9, 1972. The project was described as a landfill of demolition, excavation, and river-dredge spoils materials. Proposed ultimate uses of the site included dryland log storage and dredge spoil transfer facilities. The fill of approximately 200,000 cubic yards would raise the site's elevation from 5-11 feet to 17 feet.

In March, 1973, a draft environmental impact statement (EIS), based in part on information supplied by appellant's engineer, was prepared and circulated by the Planning Department to city, county, and state agencies. A final EIS incorporating agency responses was completed prior to the Snohomish County Planning Commission's public hearing on the application, held May 22, 1973. Appellant's wife, engineer, and attorney testified at the public hearing on the project.

The Planning Commission found that the proposed development was inconsistent with the policies of the Shoreline Management Act (SMA) and guidelines promulgated pursuant thereto. It further found that the project would establish a precedent for industrial land use of the

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

-6

Snohomish River Flood Plain and was contra to the purpose of the National Flood Insurance Program of encouraging the retention of flood-prone areas for open space. On the bases of these and other stated findings, on May 22, 1973, the Planning Commission unanimously recommended denial of the application to the Board of County Commissioners.

In a letter to the Board dated May 30, 1973, appellant challenged the Planning Commission's decision, requested a hearing before the Board, and asked to be notified of any public hearings held on the matter. Chapter 21.12 of the Snohomish County Code regulates the issuance of shoreline development permits. Section 21.21.090, "Duties of the Board," requires that if the Board alters any recommendation of the Planning Commission, it must conduct its own public hearing on the application. On June 11, 1973, at a public meeting, the Commissioners unanimously resolved to concur in all findings and recommendations of the Planning Commission and denied the application. Appellant timely filed his request for review of this decision on June 20, 1973.

ν

The hearing on the merits of this matter was repeatedly continued at the request of both parties, pending completion of a study by the Army Corps of Engineers intended to designate the floodway for the lower Snohomish River. The study as received by Snohomish County on September 12, 1975, detailed four alternative floodway designations. Under three of the four alternatives, the project site was included within the floodway which would preclude any obstructive development on the property. Under alternative four, appellant's property would be located within the floodway fringe thus removing it from the proscription of

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

development thereon under the National Flood Insurance Program. The Corps study made no attempt to recommend to the County any one of the four alternatives, considering such designation a land use decision within the County's preorogatives. It was further elicited at hearing that the four alternatives were merely representative of an indefinite number of such floodway designation alternatives created by the River's multiple channel configuration.

VI

At a pre-hearing conference held in this matter on March 20, 1974, the parties stipulated that if the permit were to be granted, the project fill would consist solely of river-dredge spoils from the Corps of Engineers' dredging of the Snohomish River. Testimony at hearing indicated that (a) a need for additional river-dredge spoils sites for the lower Snohomish River does exist; (b) the Planning Department staff would continue to object to appellant's site for such spoils, and (c) at no time subsequent to the stipulation did the project as so modified come before the Snohomish County Planning Commission or the Board of County Commissioners for official review and action.

VII

Any Conclusion of Law hereinafter recited which should be deemed a Finding of Fact is hereby adopted as such.

From these Findings, the Shorelines Hearings Board comes to these CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The proposed project before this Board in terms of ruling on appellant's challenges to respondent's action is as the project was

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

-6

described at the time the Board of County Commissioners rendered its decision on the application, i.e., June 11, 1973.

ΙI

Appellant contends that "the procedures followed by Snohomish County in denying the appellant's permit application without a hearing constitute a denial of procedural due process." Neither the SMA nor the relevant guideline promulgated pursuant thereto (WAC 173-14-080) mandates local government to provide a public hearing prior to the issuance or denial of a permit. The guarantee of a public hearing under the Snohomish County Code in those instances where the Board of County Commissioners fails to agree with all the Planning Commission findings and recommendations is not applicable in this case. Appellant was in fact afforded an opportunity to present his views at the Planning Commission's public hearing and through this request for review, his case has again been publicly stated. Under these circumstances, the failure of the Snohomish Board of County Commissioners to hold its own public hearing on appellant's application does not constitute a denial of procedural due process.

III

Appellant urges that the action of the Board of County Commissioners in denying the permit was an "arbitrary and capricious" decision based solely on the slanted findings and recommendations of the planning staff and commission. Appellant failed to meet its burden of proof as to the alleged characterization of the Planning Commission findings and recommendations. Further, the Board concludes that the action of the Board of County Commissioners was taken upon due consideration of the

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

facts upon which reasonable men could differ and was not arbitrary and capricious.

IV

Appellant invokes the appearance of fairness doctrine and argues that a violation of this doctrine occurred when the Board of County Commissioners failed to afford appellant a second hearing, thereby relying on the "strong" voices, the Planning Commission, to the exclusion of the "weak," the appellant Graham. The appearance of fairness doctrine as developed by the Washington courts is concerned with potential conflict of interest or impropriety on the part of reviewing officials. Its application to facts such as are alleged by appellant in this matter is an ill-founded extension of the doctrine.

Dredge river spoils were included as a proposed use in appellant's initial application. Therefore, respondent Snohomish County did have an opportunity to consider the effects of such a modified landfill and to issue a permit restricted accordingly.

The record now before this Board supports the respondent's failure to grant a permit for a landfill composed solely of river dredge spoils. In particular, although appellant did establish that a floodway could be designated in this area which did not include the subject site, no such designation has in fact been made. Until such designation is made, the filling of clearly potential floodway property is violative of the purposes of the Shoreline Management Act and cannot be condoned.

27 | FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

-6

27 | FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

Appellant submits that even if a permit is not granted, the project site falls within the ancient plat exemption of the Shoreline Management Act and no permit is required for the project. Appellant did establish that the northerly parcel of the subject property, known as River Front Tracts (Area I) was platted prior to April 1, 1971, and that sales of such lots to appellant did occur prior to April 1, 1971.

Neither party specifically directed the Board's attention to condition (c) of the exemption. With regard to the initial proposal, the record itself is persuasive that all other requirements of the local agency would not be met. The record, however, does not conclusively rebut appellant's claim for an exemption with regard to the modified project.

Contrary to respondent's assumption with respect to subsection (e) of the exemption, appellant need not establish that his project would have been completed by June 1, 1973. Rather, for sites which otherwise

<sup>1. &</sup>quot;No permit shall be required for any development on shorelines of the state included within a preliminary or final plat approved by the applicable state agency or local government prior to April 1, 1971, if:

<sup>(</sup>a) The final plat was approved after April 13, 1961, or the preliminary plat was approved after April 30, 1969, or

<sup>(</sup>b) Sales of lots to purchasers with reference to the plat, or substantial development incident to platting or required by the plat, occurred prior to April 1, 1971, and

<sup>(</sup>c) The development to be made without a permit meets all requirements of the applicable state agency or local government, other than requirements imposed pursuant to this chapter, and

<sup>(</sup>e) The development is completed within two years after the effective date of this chapter." RCW 90.58.140(9).

qualify, the ancient plat exemption obviated the need to have a shoreline permit for developments thereon until June 1, 1973. No development could continue without a permit beyond that date.

In the instant matter, by tolling the statute on the date the application was filed, November 9, 1972, the appellant would have a maximum of seven months within which to fill on the site as stipulated.

The Board concludes that an exemption from the requisites of a shoreline permit apparently does lie for a fill of dredge river spoils on Area I for seven months. However, appellant is reminded that even where the ancient plat exemption applies, the project must be found to be consistent with the policies of the Shoreline Management Act.<sup>2</sup> It should further be noted that the Act grants to local governments the authority to enforce the provisions of the Act.<sup>3</sup>

VII

Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such.

Therefore, the Shorelines Hearings Board issues this

2. "Exemption from the effect of the SMA of 1971 under RCW 90.58.140(9)(b)(c) applies only to permit requirements of the Act by its terms; as limited, it does not extend to the policy provision in RCW 90.58.140(1)." Putnam v. Carroll, 13 Wn. App. 201, 204 (1975)

"Compliance with the policy of the Act is required of all projects, including those which do not require a permit." WAC 173-14-040.

3. RCW 90.58.210.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

-6

1	ORDER
2	The denial by the respondent Snohomish County Board of Commissioners
3	of the substantial development permit sought by appellant, D. D. Graham,
4	is affirmed.
5	DATED this 13rd day of February, 1976.
6	SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD
7	Did not participate
8	CHRIS SMITH, Chairman
9	Dut 5 Roff
10	ROBERT E. BEATY, Member
11	( Let )) en uine l
12	RALPH A. BESWICK, Member
13	Ml Jessberg
14	W. A. GISSBERG, Member
15	Xxxx V + Huit
16	ROBERT F. HINTZ, Member
17	Halt Woodward
18	WALT WOODWARD, Member
19	
20	
21	

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

2